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I ntr oducti on (1)
This paper looks across China’s southwest continentalborders to examine China in relation to the Mekongregion. As a preliminary enquiry into constructions
of the region by different parties in accordance with their
interests and ideological dispositions, this paper focuses on
Chinese constructions. It seeks to identify the motivations
behind China’s engagement with the region, and under what
conditions China is construed as part of or separate from the
Mekong region. It further examines the different concep-
tions of the region by Chinese authorities at the central and
provincial level. (2) The research is set against a background
of diverse and increasing Chinese engagement with south-
east Asia, (3) and the broader phenomena of globalisation
and regionalisation, which have engendered growth in trans-
border institutions and in mechanisms for regional coopera-
tion and integration. 
The concept of region (4) is a contested one, and any attempt
to start with a definition of region, the related concepts of
regionalisation or regionalism, or specifically of the
“Mekong region” inevitably privileges a particular under-
standing. This paper does not, for example, look only at
what has become known as the Greater Mekong Subregion
(see below). Instead it takes a constructivist approach to
regional formation, which views regions as politically, social-
ly, historically, and ideologically constructed, not simply as
given geographical areas. This is not to argue that regional
constructions are somehow purely abstract or arbitrary and
without any “objective” reality; rather, these constructions
are informed by a range of contingent geographical, histori-
cal, political, economic, and social factors. (5) I argue below
that this approach to regional formation is borne out by the
literature, which offers a range of different constructions of
the “Mekong region” based either on the Mekong river
basin, a political geography defined by functional perspec-
tives of security or economic development, or through the
region’s relationship with larger regional structures such as
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Some of these constructions include China or parts of it, and
others place the region outside China’s borders. It is this
issue, of what happens at the intersection or overlap of these
various regional constructions, that not only raises the ques-
tion of whether China is construed as part of or separate
from the region, but also underlies the differences that exist
between central and provincial Chinese approaches. (6)
The paper begins by introducing the two key Mekong region
institutions and the types of connections in the region, then
China and 
the Mekong Region 
T I M  S U M M E R S
1. I am grateful to my supervisor at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Professor Arif
Dirlik, for his guidance and for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the
anonymous reviewer(s) for their comments. 
2. For a provincial perspective on international relations see for example P. Cheung and J.
Tang, “The External Relations of China’s Provinces,” in David Lampton (ed), The Making
of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, Stanford,
Stanford University Press, 2001.
3. See for example, Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, New York, Oxford University
Press, 2007, pp. 111 ff.
4. For the purposes of this paper, “region” is used in a supra- or trans-national sense, and
not for the development of subnational regions within nation states. 
5. See for example Arif Dirlik, “The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the
Invention of a Regional Structure,” in What Is In A Rim? second edition, Lanham, MD,
Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. Following Dirlik (op. cit., p. 33, note 2) I will use “region”
as a general term when setting out constructs of human activity or analyses of the dif-
ferent understandings of the “Mekong region” in the existing literature, and use “area”
when referring to the physical geographical entity.
6. There is another layer of analysis, which would look at the involvement of the “south-
west region” within China. 
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This paper looks at constructions of the Mekong region with a particular focus on Chinese views. It draws out the
differences between central and provincial Chinese perspectives, shows Chinese privileging of Greater Mekong
Subregion economic cooperation in constructing the region, and outlines tensions between Chinese participation in
and differentiation from the region.
problematises different constructions of the region. This is
followed by discussion of China’s role in and views on the
region and these institutions, differentiated at the central and
provincial levels. Finally, the paper shows that economic
motivations dominate Chinese constructions of the region,
and outlines the tension between China’s participation in
and differentiation from the region.I nsti tuti onal  a r ra ngem e nts  int he Me kong r e gi on
A number of institutional arrangements (over)determine the
Mekong region, which takes its name from the river that
flows 4,800 km (7) from the Tibetan plateau through Yunnan
Province, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, then on through
Cambodia and into a delta in the south of Vietnam. (8) I
focus below on the two institutions that relate most directly
to the Mekong. These are the Greater Mekong Subregion
(GMS) Programme for Economic Cooperation, of which
China is a key member, and the Mekong River Commission
(MRC), of which China is not a member but whose work
is affected directly by China’s actions in the upstream
Mekong river. Wider developments in East Asia and in par-
ticular between China and Southeast Asia, including
through ASEAN, on which there is a burgeoning literature,
are also relevant, although they cover a much wider range of
issues than the scope of this paper.
The history of conceptualisations of the Mekong region is an
important background to contemporary constructions of the
region. Sachchidanand Sahai has traced this history leading
to the nineteenth century French expeditions that used the
Mekong to “open up” China for mineral exploration and
trade, and their subsequent realisation of the difficulties in
developing a navigable route along the Mekong to Yunnan
Province, (9) an approach that implicitly places China outside
the Mekong region as the target of trade to be reached by
passing through the region. 
T h e Meko n g River  Commis s ion  (MR C) ( 10 )
This paper’s focus on contemporary institutional structures
begins with the establishment of the Mekong Committee,
sponsored in 1957 by the United Nations to coordinate
water resource development among the downstream nations
of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. After
what Jacobs describes as an early period of “optimism” and
substantial funding identified for regional projects, conflict in
the peninsula interrupted the Committee’s work from the
1970s. Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (re)formed an Interim
Mekong Committee in 1978. Subsequently Cambodia
joined the new Mekong River Commission (MRC) at its
formation in 1995. The MRC’s stated aim is sustainable
development of the Mekong River Basin, an area that is sub-
stantially more important to downstream than to upstream
states, as the basin spreads out to cover nearly all of
Cambodia, much of Laos, and the fertile and productive
delta in Vietnam. It operates through a series of programmes
agreed between the member states and supported by a sec-
retariat. 
The MRC’s current membership of Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam reflects its historical origins. Jacobs
says that the “[original] organization was limited to member-
ship of the lower Mekong nations only, as China was not a
member of the United Nations in the early 1950s and
Burma was simply not interested in participating.” Although
the 1995 Legal Agreement allows for China’s membership,
China has, according to Jacobs, not expressed an interest in
joining the (post-1995) MRC, (11) though both China and
Myanmar have since become MRC “Dialogue Partners.”
Jacobs’ 1995 article paints a generally positive view of the
potential for MRC collaboration with China. He does not,
for example, discuss the Manwan dam, completed by China
on the upper river in 1995 and later a source of contention.
His 2002 article, however, identifies China’s role as a key
challenge for the MRC, which by then had shifted its focus
to monitoring and macro-management of the river basin
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7. Jeffrey Jacobs, “Mekong Committee History and Lessons for River Basin Development,”
Geographical Journal, 161/2, 1995, cites Mekong River Secretariat 1989 figures of
around 4,200 km for the length of the river (p. 354). Chinese sources put the length at
over 4,800 km, and this is the figure currently used on the Mekong River Commission
Secretariat website (www.mrcmekong.org). As I comment towards the end of the paper,
naming of the river varies along its length. It is worth noting that much of the literature
on MRC makes little reference to the GMS. 
8. See Evelyn Goh, Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and Regional Security in China-
Southeast Asian Relations, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Routledge, 2007, p. 27, for a summary of the plethora of institutional arrangements in
the wider Mekong region. 
9. Sachchidanand Sahai, The Mekong River: Space And Social Theory, Delhi, B.R. Pub.
Corp., 2005. See also Milton Osborne, The Mekong: Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future, St
Leonards, NSW, Allen and Unwin, 2000, for more on the French expeditions. 
10. This summary is drawn from Jacobs art. cit., Jacobs, “The Mekong River Commission:
Transboundary Water Resources Planning and Regional Security,” Geographical Journal,
168/4, 2002, pp. 360-63, and the MRC website, www.mrcmekong.org.
11. Jacobs art.cit., 2002, p. 356 (citing Mekong Secretariat, The Mekong Committee: A
Historical Account, Bangkok 1989) and p. 361. Goh says that China “refuses to become
a member of the institution” (op. cit., p. 38). 
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A tributary of the Mekong River, 
Xishuangbanna, Yunnan Province 
© Tim Summers
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
rather than specific projects or dam construction. This is in
contrast to the more economic or integrationist agenda of the
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), to which I now turn. (12)
Th e G reat er Mekon g S u breg ion  (G MS)
The GMS programme was established in 1992 following
agreement by Cambodia, China, Laos, Burma, Thailand,
Vietnam (henceforth the “GMS members”), and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). (13) The geographical area cov-
ered (the “GMS area”) includes the countries of
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, with
the addition of China’s Yunnan Province and, from 2005,
China’s province-level Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region (see below for more on China’s membership). (14)
By 2007 the population of this area had reached 320 mil-
lion. (15)
The ADB stresses the economic nature of GMS coopera-
tion, described in its early days as a loose mechanism for
cooperation in a “natural economic area,” (16) with priority
given to transport links and energy infrastructure rather than
to the creation of a more formal structure such as a trade
bloc. The momentum of GMS cooperation was interrupted
after 1997 by the Asian financial crisis, but a new phase
began around 2001, (17) marked by agreement among GMS
heads of government on a Strategic Framework for 2002 to
2012 at their first GMS summit in 2002. This “envisioned ‘a
GMS that is more integrated, prosperous, and equitable.’” (18)
There has also been a steady broadening over time of the
scope of the GMS programme, with the inclusion of coop-
eration to manage challenges such as narcotics and human
trafficking, environmental degradation, and the spread of
infectious diseases such as avian flu and HIV/AIDS. (19) In
this context, there is brief acknowledgement by the ADB
that the transport links that formed the core of much of the
regional integration have also led to an increase in the trans-
border nature of such challenges, and not just to facilitated
trade relations or the promotion of economic develop-
ment. (20) It operates its series of programmes through consul-
tation and coordination between the member states, with an
active Secretariat role played by the ADB. 
Pr oblema tis in g th e  Meko n g reg ion
Before turning to China and the region, it is important to
look for context in the ways that the literature constructs or
problematises the region. I suggest this is done through four
different themes: economic cooperation and development,
river and basin management, security, and wider integration.
Most of the literature that construes the region as GMS
focuses on economic development and cooperation, examin-
ing issues such as whether the GMS has delivered econom-
ic development, and the different levels of development
within the region; (21) on whether the GMS, which in one
account does “not aim at economic integration of the partic-
ipating countries,” (22) is likely to be engulfed by ASEAN-
based free-trade arrangements; or on examining the potential
for bilateral economic cooperation. (23)
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12. The ADB representative at the fifth GMS conference in November 1995 said that the
MRC, newly (re)formed that year, had an important role to play in promoting subregion-
al economic cooperation (ADB 1996, Economic cooperation in the GMS: Facing the chal-
lenges, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 1996, p. 19), but the MRC representative at
the same conference made clear that he saw the MRC’s goal as “sustainable develop-
ment of the Mekong river basin” (ibid., p. 69).
13. This account of the development of GMS cooperation is based largely on ADB policy
statements, studies, public records of meetings, technical assistance documents for spe-
cific projects, public relations material or brochures, and the ADB website
(www.adb.org/GMS). Its own characterisation of its role shifts over time, but consistent-
ly sets out to avoid any impression that it might be the lead organisation in GMS devel-
opment. As the Secretariat to the GMS, the ADB has been responsible for drawing up pro-
posals and planning activity. Combined with its role as financial coordinator and provider
this gives it a strong influence over the developments within the GMS. There is also oppo-
sition to the ADB’s role and strategy, including from NGOs such as Oxfam. Philip Hirsch
analyses some of the regional resistance to ADB activity in “Globalisation, Regionalisation
and Local Voices: the Asian Development Bank and rescaled politics of environment in the
Mekong Region,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 22/3, 2001, pp. 237-251.
14. The use of the term “subregion” rather than “region” apparently stems from ADB divi-
sion of its business in Asia into the large regions of East Asia, Southwest Asia, etc. As
the six countries along the Mekong cover parts of both the East Asia region (China) and
Southwest Asia (the other five countries), “subregion” therefore fits with the ADB’s exist-
ing regional structure. This creates a subregional level “lower” than the existing regions
defined by ADB but crossing from one region to another (personal information, July
2008). The ADB’s role and agenda lie outside the scope of this paper but deserve sep-
arate detailed analysis.
15. ADB, Strategic Framework 2002-2012: Mid-Term Review, 2007, downloaded from
www.adb.org July 2008.
16. ADB, Economic Cooperation in ihe GMS: Facing the Challenges, Manila, Asian
Development Bank, 1996, p. 3.
17. Medhi Krongkaew, “The development of the Greater Mekong Subregion: Real promise
or fake hope?” Journal of Asian Economics, 15/5, 2004 pp. 977-998.
18. Cited in ADB, Mid-Term Review, p. 5.
19. See for example ADB, Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and
Socialist Republic of Vietnam For Preparing the GMS Regional Communicable Diseases
Control Project, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 2004.
20. ADB, The GMS, Beyond Borders: Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program 2004-
2008, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 2004, pp. 48-49.
21. Krongkaew, art. cit., also claims a strong “pivotal” role for Thailand, which enjoys the
highest per capita income levels and tends to dominate the terms of trade. 
22. Mya Than, “Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion,” Asian-Pacific
Economic Literature, 11/2, 1997, p. 41.
23. Siriluk Masviriyakul, “Sino-Thai Strategic Economic Development in the Greater Mekong
Subregion (1992-2003),” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26/2, 2004, pp. 302-319, sees
great potential for further trade between Yunnan and northern Thailand, but also high-
lights transborder problems. Yang Hongchang, Yunnan sheng yu Meigong he quyu
hezuo: Zhongguo difang zizhuquan de fazhan, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press,
2001, focuses on Yunnan and its trade with neighbours, but also integrates (traditional
and non-traditional) security issues into his analysis. Note that Yang talks about the
Mekong “region” rather than “subregion.”
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China and the Mekong Region
A second way of problematising the region, for example in
writings on the MRC, conceives the river and basin as the
key determinants of the region’s identity, often with a strong
emphasis on hydropower development and hence a focus on
relations between upstream and downstream countries. As
shown in a detailed and specialist account by Hiroshi
Hori, (24) a Japanese engineer with decades of personal expe-
rience working on projects along the Mekong, it is not only
Chinese dam building that serves as a potential source of
conflict, (25) but also, for example, Vietnamese opposition to
Thai dam building. Hori also criticises a 1962 report com-
missioned by the Mekong Committee for viewing “the
Lower Mekong Basin as a single enclosed ‘system.’” (26)
Separately, Darrin Magee argues that Yunnan’s participation
in China’s Western Development Strategy legitimises the
development of hydropower to supply eastern markets with-
in China, while its membership in the GMS similarly legit-
imises hydropower development to meet increased power
demand in the Mekong region (understood here as the
GMS area, showing the increased dominance of the GMS
conception). (27) Karen Bakker uses discourse analysis to
show how much of the development discourse is based on
an assumption that the “undeveloped” river is uncommodi-
fied, and hence the discourse is underpinned by a rescaling
from the local to the urban, regional, or international level,
with hydrodevelopment “portrayed as the creation of uses
and users, rather than the reprioritisation or even displace-
ment of uses.” (28)
A third understanding of the region and its institutions is in
terms of regional security. This approach broadens out the
issues to include ASEAN, and hence puts less emphasis on
either the GMS or MRC. Evelyn Goh takes the Mekong
basin – a “natural ecological unit” with a “common develop-
ment imperative” – as a case study of the potential domina-
tion by China of “the part of the region that has already
been ‘ceded’ to the Chinese sphere of influence.” (29) Jörn
Dosch acknowledges the economic focus of the GMS mech-
anism, but claims that “security has been an equally if not
more important dimension,” (30) with the building of trust and
confidence as its main achievement, although the ADB’s
“necessary” role in this, along with what Dosch highlights as
the elite nature of the process, should raise questions about
the sustainability of such gains.
Fourthly, an emphasis on regional integration is found partic-
ularly in ADB publications. “The GMS — Beyond Borders:
Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program 2004-2008”
reflects a stronger integrationist agenda, including a claim
that the GMS is “no longer a simple group of countries: it
is a regional entity.” (31) This agenda is less apparent in the
ADB’s 2007-09 Programme Update, although it still talks
about the “GMS vision of a prosperous, integrated and har-
monious subregion.” (32)
Drawing together elements from these different conceptual-
isations, Xiangming Chen examines the GMS as part of a
wider study of the evolution of borders and transnational
spaces in Asia. (33) He suggests that the Mekong River
“bind[s] the riparian GMS countries together” and that
“the 1990s marked a new decade for the Mekong River
region with the launch of the GMS programme and the
opening of China’s southwest.” (34) But by privileging the
GMS in his analysis, he ends up describing the MRC as a
“mechanism for GMS cooperation,” (35) even though (as he
notes) not all GMS members belong to the MRC, and their
remits differ. Bringing in non-state actors, Chen identifies
three main drivers of integration and cooperation: decentral-
isation, which has led to increased border trade without the
need for government projects; ethnic ties; (36) and the trans-
port links at the heart of inter-state cooperation facilitated by
the ADB. 
This analysis shows the different conceptions of the region
that can arise in line with the constructivist approach out-
lined above. The questions then become how different con-
ceptions of the region occur, where their boundaries lie, who
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24. Hiroshi Hori, The Mekong: Environment and Development, Tokyo, United Nations
University Press, 2000.
25. As for example in Goh, op. cit., and Fred Pearce, When the Rivers Run Dry: Water, the
Defining Crisis of the Twenty-first Century, Boston, Beacon Press, 2006.
26. Hori, op. cit., p. 129. For example, the report failed to anticipate the impact on the basin
of later mass migration from the lower basin to cities outside it such as Bangkok.
27. Darrin Magee, “Powershed Politics: Yunnan Hydropower Under Great Western
Development,” The China Quarterly, 185, 2006, pp. 23-41.
28. K Bakker, “The Politics of Hydropower: Developing the Mekong,” Political Geography, 18,
1999, p. 220, italics in original.
29. Goh, op. cit., p. 9, though it is not clear whose perception this is. 
30. Jörn Dosch, “Crossing Cold War Divides: Cooperation in the Mekong Valley,” in The
Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2007, pp. 117 ff.
31. ADB, The GMS, Beyond Borders: Regional cooperation strategy and program 2004-
2008, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 2004, p. 25.
32. ADB, Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program Update, The Greater Mekong
Subregion - Beyond Borders (2007-2009), Manila, Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 1,
my italics.
33. Chen Xiangming, As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim, Rowman &
Littlefield, 2005.
34. Ibid., p. 204.
35. Ibid., p. 195. 
36. These ethnic ties merit further study. Don McCaskill, Prasit Leepreecha, and He
Shaoying (eds), Living in a Globalized World: Ethnic Minorities in the Greater Mekong
Subregion, Chiang Mai, Thailand, Mekong Press, 2008, aims to look at the impact of
globalisation, regionalism and nationalism on the cultures, social systems, and environ-
ments of the ethnic minorities in the GMS region. 
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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
acts as the agent of these constructions, the region’s “pur-
pose,” and if and how these are further broken down into
(sub)regions or are themselves seen as subsets of larger
regional structures. I suggest that the multiplicity of institu-
tional structures in the Mekong region, with their different
members and objectives, is an empirical manifestation of
these varied constructions of the region. Dosch’s passing
comment that the GMS “look[s] more like a collection of
many subregions, instead of one cohesive subregion” (37)
highlights the lack of “intrinsic” regional coherence against
efforts to present the region as “naturally” occurring or con-
stituted. It is for this reason that we cannot examine China
and the Mekong by privileging any one of the institutions
that cover the area under study. The  rol e  of  China  i n  theMe kong r egi on
Having looked at the two main regional institutions and the
problematisation of the region, I now turn to Chinese per-
ceptions of the region, breaking these down into the central
and provincial levels of the government system, and using
material from China-based academics. (38) As noted above, it
is important to bear in mind that China’s relationship with
the Mekong should not be reduced to its activities in the
GMS, but given China’s membership of this organisation, it
nonetheless features strongly in this section. 
It is worth first highlighting the peculiar fact that China’s
geographical participation in the GMS (the “GMS area”)
is limited to only part of the country, initially Yunnan, with
Guangxi joining in 2005. The reasons for this are not much
explored in the literature. Yang suggests that China’s size
meant it was not “appropriate” for the whole country to par-
ticipate in GMS (39) (rather than, for example, arguing that
Yunnan “naturally” belonged to the region). This unusual
membership structure raises the question of how China’s
involvement in GMS programmes has been managed. From
the outset, China’s chief representatives at GMS meetings
have been from the central government, (40) with the delega-
tions including a mixture of central and Yunnan provincial
government representatives, and a provincial government
representative as deputy delegation leader. 
Pers pec tives  fr om th e  cen tr e
The most recent detailed publicly-available document from
China’s central government, hereafter the “Country
Report,” (41) was prepared for the Vientiane GMS Leaders
Summit in March 2008 by the National Development and
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
the Ministry of Finance. The text refers consistently to
“China” (not Yunnan and Guangxi) as the participant in
GMS, and shows signs of substantial central coordination of
Chinese activity. It refers to Yunnan and Guangxi as “the
regions of China to participate directly in GMS coopera-
tion,” (42) adding that both provinces need to increase their
openness in order to develop. Its emphasis, therefore, is
more on the GMS of six members than the GMS as a geo-
graphical area. This in effect increases the weight given to
the role of the central authorities in China’s GMS-related
activity, possibly as the result of central government efforts to
control the agenda as part of an ongoing dialectic between
central and local authorities. 
The Country Report offers analysis of China’s bilateral
trade with each of the five other members of GMS, show-
ing that China has substantial surpluses with all except
Thailand. While trade and investment are on the GMS
agenda, commercial activity is far from constrained within
the GMS structure, and I suggest that the Chinese empha-
sis is an example of China using the GMS to promote a
wider agenda with the Mekong members. The Country
Report also outlines China’s activity against a series of
themes that broadly correlate to the main sectors of GMS
Programmes, (43) including the challenges of avian flu, drugs,
human trafficking, and maintaining biodiversity. The
Country Report has little on water and river management:
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37. Dosch, op. cit., p. 135.
38. Further work could supplement this with a wider range of bottom-up views from within
China. As noted above, the extensive broader literature on China and ASEAN also gives
a wider context.
39. Yang, op. cit., p. xii.
40. China’s representation at the early meetings was at a much lower level than the other
five countries. While the five sent Ministers or in some cases Deputy Prime Ministers,
China’s delegation was headed by the Acting Director of the International Department of
the People’s Bank of China in both 1993 and 1994 (ADB, Economic Cooperation In The
Greater Mekong Subregion: Proceedings Of The Second Conference On Subregional
Economic Cooperation, 30-31 August 1993, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 1993;
and ADB, Subregional Economic Cooperation: Proceedings Of The Fourth Conference,
Chiang Mai, Thailand, 15-16 September 1994, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 1994).
The seniority of the Chinese representative at the November 1995 meeting was greater:
the deputy minister-level Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission (ADB,
Economic Cooperation In The GMS: Facing The Challenges, Manila, Asian Development
Bank, 1996). 
41. Country Report on China’s Participation in Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation,
2008, downloaded from http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/ July 2008 (henceforth “Country Report”). 
42. Ibid., p. 21.
43. The Chinese report uses “communication” for transport, separates out health coopera-
tion as a separate area, and combines trade and investment into one section, but oth-
erwise is structured in the same way as the Plan of Action agreed by GMS national lead-
ers in Vientiane (ADB, Vientiane Plan of Action for GMS Development 2008-2012, 2008,
downloaded from www.adb.org July 2008). 
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China and the Mekong Region
there are brief references to hydropower under energy, as
well as a reference to dredging work between Jinghong
(southern Yunnan) and the Burmese border, which aims to
make that part of the river navigable by 300t vessels, but
which has also led to concerns from downstream countries
about its impact on river flow. 
These central views are reflected in some of the papers
delivered at a conference in Yunnan’s provincial capital
Kunming in 2005 and collated in a volume published by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2007. (44)
Taken together, these essays present a broadly positive
assessment of developments in the region. Although the vol-
ume is entitled “A study on economic cooperation in the
Greater Mekong Subregion,” a number of the contributors,
especially those from Beijing, focus on China and ASEAN
issues with scant reference to the Mekong or GMS. This
suggests that over recent years at least, Mekong regional
cooperation has been increasingly seen as part of a bigger
picture of China’s developing relations in the wider south-
east Asian region – one contributor conceptualises GMS as
a land route to southeast Asia for China. (45)
The volume is introduced by Zhang Yunling, head of the
Asia-Pacific research centre at CASS in Beijing. Zhang
argues that economic cooperation is about more than devel-
oping a free-trade area, and hence there is value in GMS
cooperation beyond the aims of a free trade agenda. Of the
other CASS contributors, Lu Jianren outlines what he sees
as the “backwardness” of the GMS region and China’s pos-
itive contribution to its development, while Zhou Xiaobing
argues that the central government has become more
focused over time on the GMS, having initially seen it as
more an issue for local government participation. Cai Yu
notes that GMS is driven by government activity and not the
private sector, and reiterates the point that it is functionally
based rather than a nascent free-trade area, giving it objec-
tives and structure different from those of ASEAN. 
P ro vin ci al  per s pecti ves –  Y u n na n. . .
Contributions to the same volume by scholars from Yunnan
(both the provincial Academy of Social Sciences and
Yunnan University) paint more local and detailed pictures.
He Shengda stresses Yunnan’s role as the “main Chinese
province” in GMS, and calls on the central government to
make more of this. For Zhang Lin, GMS cooperation
should go beyond the economic sphere to increase the accu-
mulation of social capital. Other scholars from Yunnan
University focus on specific areas, for example arguing that
the competence structure of the GMS is weak and the
region’s ability to attract foreign direct investment is there-
fore limited, highlighting the differences within the region in
levels of logistics and manufacturing development, the differ-
ent demographics between countries within GMS, and the
need for international cooperation to control the trade in and
use of illegal drugs. 
Many of these themes are reflected in Yunnan government
publications. Yunnan Provincial Economic Statistical
Yearbooks contain substantial sections on regional econom-
ic cooperation that are dominated by developments within
“the GMS,” while much less coverage is given to the issue
of economic cooperation with other provinces in China (the
third area covered in recent years is Yunnan’s growing links
with India, Bangladesh, and Burma under a separate institu-
tional structure). The GMS material began to appear in the
Yearbook in 2002, ten years after the GMS was estab-
lished, and the year of the first GMS national leaders’ sum-
mit, which followed the injection of new life into GMS
around 2001. This 2002 entry offers a brief introduction to
the background of the GMS, stressing economic coopera-
tion between the countries involved rather than any hints of
the creation of a regional bloc or identity. It also mentions
the MRC and China’s “participation” in water resource
sharing, giving a more positive picture than that painted by
those who criticise China for not joining or cooperating with
the MRC. (46)
Subsequent Yunnan Yearbook entries say less about either
the GMS as an institutional framework or the ADB, with
references limited to describing attendance by Yunnan’s
leaders at GMS meetings and summits. Rather, the content
provides paragraph summaries of specific projects involving
Yunnan and other countries – or sometimes provinces of
these countries – within the GMS region. These range
across the sectors covered by GMS, including hydropower
projects, the opening of road, rail, or air links, the facilitation
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44. CASS: Cai Yu, Lu Jianren, and Yang Xianming (eds), Da Meigong he ci quyu jingji hezuo
yanjiu (A study on economic cooperation in Greater Mekong Subregion), Beijing, Shehui
kexue wenxian chuban she, 2007.
45. A separate record of a UN Development Programme-sponsored conference in April 2002
in Kunming on GMS economic cooperation puts the topic in the context of the creation
of a China-ASEAN single market of 450 million people (downloaded from
www.yn.gov.cn, July 2008).
46. Vietnamese views in particular express dissatisfaction with China’s role and actions. See
for example the series of contributions from Vietnamese scholars in Dosch et al. (eds),
Economic and Non-traditional Security Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion,
Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2005. However Kayo Onishi (“Hydropolitics of
China and Downstream Countries in the Mekong River Basin,” downloaded from
www.mekongnet.org/images/b/b6/Onishi.pdf), sees China as “gradually compromis[ing]
with downstream countries.”
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of border crossing through issuing visas at ports, and visits to
and from Yunnan by official delegations. There are also
descriptions of commercial projects, such as an agreement
with Laos granting exploration rights to the Yunnan Copper
Company, (47) which are arguably more dependent on the rel-
evant bilateral relationship than on the GMS. The overall
impression created is of Yunnan proactively building links
and developing cooperation, rather than of a six-sided coop-
erative structure delivering regional integration, or of a nas-
cent borderless region, an impression that takes us outside
the GMS institution to wider regional activity. Separately,
efforts in Yunnan to build a regional concept can be seen in
a popular history and tourism book that the author describes
as part of the Yunnan government’s external publicity
work. (48) It is based around the Mekong River as the “cradle
of Indochina’s Peninsular Culture,” and against a back-
ground of the Mekong becoming “more submerged in an
ever-increasing tide of globalization and regional integra-
tion.” (49)
… an d G ua ng xi
Although Guangxi does not share the Mekong basin, the
geographical involvement of China in GMS was extended to
include Guangxi in March 2005. In a page on its website
entitled “Broadening the Benefits,” the ADB justifies
Guangxi’s inclusion as “one of two provinces in the PRC
that share borders with other GMS countries” (i.e.,
Vietnam). It sees the province’s participation as “a natural
northward extension of the GMS’ [sic] geography – a clear
outcome of strengthening economic relations between the
PRC and other GMS countries.” (50) This shows that the
GMS regional conception has become further divorced from
the Mekong River itself. 
Given the potential for economic competition between
China’s provinces, (51) it is worth looking at Yunnan’s reac-
tions to Guangxi’s subsequent membership of GMS.
Yunnan’s 2006 Economic Statistics Yearbook refers to
Guangxi’s participation in GMS cooperation being agreed
in March 2005, following a “suggestion” by Premier Wen
Jiabao in November 2004. This is described as a symbol of
China’s commitment to cooperation with the five countries,
as well as an opportunity for Guangxi. However He
Shengda from the Yunnan provincial Academy of Social
Sciences stresses that Yunnan is the main Chinese represen-
tative in GMS. (52) Material from the Yunnan Government
website, prepared around the time of the GMS summit in
Kunming in 2005 and when Guangxi’s participation was
already known, says that China’s participation means partic-
ipation by Yunnan. (53) At a June 2008 meeting of the GMS
Economic Corridor Forum in Kunming, provincial Governor
Qin Guangrong said that Yunnan was China’s “main
province” for participation in GMS and was at the frontline
of cooperation. (54) I suggest this indicates that Guangxi
remains marginal to Yunnan’s construction of a Mekong
region. 
Guangxi’s own provincial government yearbooks and web-
site do not give much prominence to GMS cooperation,
with only passing references in talking about tourism devel-
opment. (55) Neither is Guangxi’s contribution explored by
the literature reviewed for this paper, which focuses predom-
inantly on Yunnan. Although understandable, given
Guangxi’s late participation, this is sometimes problematic,
for example in McCaskill et al, (56) which contains a map of
the GMS including Guangxi, but the text of which defines
and discusses a GMS that includes only Yunnan. 
Di ffer en tiati n g cen tr al  a n d pr ovin c ialco ns tr u cti on s
Given the limitation of China’s geographical participation
in the GMS to Yunnan and Guangxi, the always significant
central-local dynamic takes on an added layer of complexi-
ty. Although views can be sought at a range of levels both
officially and unofficially, I will limit comments in this
paper to comparing central and provincial government per-
spectives. At the provincial level, especially in Yunnan, the
stress has consistently been placed on the “GMS area,”
the geographical territory covered by cooperation pro-
grammes under the GMS, and which has privileged
Yunnan as a key player. Even with Guangxi’s subsequent
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47. Yunnan Provincial Government Statistical Yearbook, 2006, pp. 208-217.
48. Liu Zhi, Zong lan liang an jin xi (Past and present of Mekong Basin), Kunming, Yunnan
minzu chuban she, 2004.
49. Quoted from the English language summary. “Indochina Peninsular” is the English ver-
sion used for the zhongnan bandao (see comments below). 
50. www.adb.org, downloaded June 2008.
51. See for example Dali Yang, Beyond Beijing, 1997, where he talks inter alia about “com-
petitive liberalization” among local governments (chapter 3). 
52. CASS, op. cit.
53. “… China refers to Yunnan Province, China,” Da Meigong he ciquyu hezuo beijing
(Background on Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation), dated 23 June 2005, down-
loaded from www.yn.gov.cn on 3 July 2008. The same emphasis was given by a range
of Yunnan officials whom I met on visits to the province. 
54. Kunming Daily, 7 June 2008, p. 1. 
55. Guangxi Provincial Yearbook 2006, p. 295.
56. McCaskill et al., op. cit.
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admission into the GMS territory, the vision of the region
from Yunnan’s capital Kunming is one in which Yunnan
Province is the paramount Chinese participant. The cen-
tral government, however, most notably through the
Country Paper, emphasises the “GMS members” as the
core of the GMS concept, in other words a region made
up of China (represented by the central government) and
the five other GMS member countries. (57) It is worth not-
ing that the high-profile involvement of Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao in the GMS national leaders’ summits (most
recently in Vientiane in 2008) stands in marked contrast to
the relatively low level of the Chinese delegation at GMS
meetings in the early 1990s (footnoted above). Zhou
Xiaobing of CASS (noted above) also argues that the cen-
tral authorities have taken the GMS more seriously over
time, perhaps reflecting the increased capacity of the state
since the 1990s, or decentralisation trends of the 1990s
and their subsequent reversal. 
There is also differentiation between the centre and the
province in their functional focus. For Yunnan, GMS helps
meet the devolved challenges of economic development,
whereas for the centre the importance of economic devel-
opment is somewhat counterbalanced by non-traditional
security challenges and the traditional security issues
around national borders. 
There is a further layer of differentiation both centrally and
provincially when referring to the GMS. Chinese writing
on the region appears to display a dialectic between GMS
as an institutional structure and GMS as a geographical or
member-based region, with, for example, the geographical
aspect reflected in the Yunnan provincial yearbooks and in
the Country Report’s treatment of trade, and the institu-
tional aspect reflected in discussion of transport integra-
tion. This cannot simply be seen as the subjugation of the
institutional structure to a wider agenda of regional cooper-
ation or integration, as it is the institutional development
that gives legitimacy to this wider regional agenda. 
I further argue that China’s role in the GMS seems to indi-
cate that, in spite of the devolution within the PRC to the
provincial level of much of the responsibility for economic
development, the centre retains a strong say in those ele-
ments of economic development that cross borders, and in
doing so promotes a dominance of politics over economics
even at the expense of the ostensible goal of economic
development. On the basis of this study, the development
of substantial provincial international policy towards eco-
nomic development therefore looks to be in its early stages
at most. 
D omi na n t Chi nes e  co n str u cti on s o f  th er egio n  
That said, there are also broad areas of similarity in central
and provincial approaches. In this penultimate section of the
paper I look at how general Chinese constructions of the
region relate to the four conceptual themes outlined earlier
in problematising the Mekong region. In spite of an initial
lack of enthusiasm for the GMS programme, (58) the domi-
nant perceptions of the Mekong region that emerge both
centrally and provincially from the material reviewed above
are a conception of the region as an instrument for econom-
ic development and cooperation, with the GMS and its
political boundaries (in terms of membership and area)
defining the region. There is a substantial overlap here with
the ADB agenda, and it is worth noting Chinese comments
that present the ADB as the driving force behind the estab-
lishment of GMS. The Country Report describes GMS as
having been set up “in response to the advocating (sic) by
Asian Development Bank,” while an earlier background
page on the Yunnan government website described the
GMS as having been established by the ADB. (59)
Privileging of the GMS is also consistent with the argument
that China’s multilateral engagement is stronger in institu-
tions where its influence is greater. (60) The GMS offers
cooperation both on a positive agenda of development that
fits variously with central and provincial priorities, and – lat-
terly – in dealing with some non-traditional security threats,
such as infectious diseases or drug and human trafficking,
that do feature marginally in Chinese approaches. 
The theme of river management hardly features in Chinese
discourse. At neither the central nor local level does cooper-
ation in managing this water resource appear to be a high
priority, although the extent of dam building on the Mekong
does indicate an interest in hydropower “development” of
the river to meet both wider national and provincial goals. (61)
The MRC, which is based on a construction of the region
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57. This is a rather more nuanced account than “[i]n this context [GMS], Yunnan functions
more as a separate unit than a pod of the central state” or “Yunnan functions as a com-
parable unit among its neighbouring countries in the GMS”; in Margaret Swain, “Looking
South: Local identities and transnational linkages in Yunnan,” in John Fitzgerald (ed),
Rethinking China’s Provinces, London and New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 197-8. Swain
has underplayed the role of the central government. 
58. At least at the central government level, see footnote 40 above.
59. Country Report, op. cit., p. 3; and material dated 23 June 2005 from www.yn.gov.cn,
downloaded 3 July 2008.
60. See the Introduction by the editors in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne (eds), China
Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, London and New York,
Routledge, 2008, p. 12.
61. See Magee, art. cit.
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around the river basin, brings problems to China in the form
of demands from downstream neighbours for more informa-
tion on the upstream river situation, and requests to reduce
hydropower development on the Chinese stretch of the river. 
I suggest that the integration theme characteristic of ADB
work is generally recast in Chinese thinking in terms of coop-
eration between states. This is consistent with the argument
that regional organisations of which China is a member
“have largely eschewed any movement toward supranational-
ity.” (62) Nonetheless, the shift in Beijing’s strategy towards
southeast Asia from the 1990s, and in particular participa-
tion in GMS, does have an integrationist flavour, reflecting
a more flexible approach to cooperation with neighbours,
and implicitly to sovereignty, than before the 1990s. It
involves willingness to engage in joint planning of regional
infrastructure (transport and energy grids), and potentially in
other areas of cooperation where rescaling to a regional level
is most evident. This is complemented by a stated desire to
work with neighbouring countries in tackling challenges such
as drugs or infectious diseases. 
However, other areas do not reflect this shift. Even when
the ADB talks of a borderless region, the specific projects
set out under this vision are more about facilitating the cross-
ing of borders than eliminating them. (63) Given China’s keen
desire to retain control of border security, for example, there
is little evidence of progress in plans for a GMS visa (which
should somehow involve China as a GMS member), and
indeed this remains at the aspirational stage in the most
recent ADB documents. (64) Yang finds that security concerns
have acted as a constraint on the more ambitious plans for
integration and opening of markets. (65) And the prominent
role given to GMS leaders’ summits in setting the direction
for GMS cooperation reinforces the sense that the nation
state remains a key power container in the region. This in
turn suggests that Mekong region cooperation falls far short
of the post-nation state integrationist thesis set out in some
recent works. (66)
Ch in a an d th e  r egion  – pa rti ci pati on  ordif fer en c e?
Finally, I ask to what extent these constructions take China
as separate from or part of the Mekong region (a distinction
perhaps made concrete by comparing its role in the GMS
and MRC respectively), not least given the political divide
between China and southeast Asia reflected in both institu-
tional structures and in foreign policy from 1949 until the
PRC’s reform and opening. The Country Report in partic-
ular is careful to refer to China and “the other GMS coun-
tries” (my emphasis), sending the message that China is not
to be seen as outside the (sub)region but participating in it.
However, there are other indicators in counterpoint to this.
One is the reference on the first page of the Country Report
to the region as a “land bridge connecting China with south-
east Asia and south Asia,” creating the impression of some-
thing to which China does not belong, and which must be
crossed in order to achieve a wider goal.
This raises the issue of the relationship between Chinese
views of the Mekong region and broader views of Southeast
Asia and East Asia, including through institutional relation-
ships with ASEAN. All the GMS countries are now mem-
bers of ASEAN, although it is important to note that this
was not the case when GMS cooperation began. (67) Some
scholars (68) now put the GMS in the wider context of the
China-ASEAN relationship, privileging the latter over the
earlier institutional work through GMS, even though (as
noted above) the nature of GMS cooperation is different
from that in ASEAN. Even at the Yunnan provincial level,
where a continued focus on GMS might be considered in
the province’s economic interest, an increasing amount of
work is being done on the impact on the province of the
China-ASEAN free trade agreement. The question remains
as to what extent Chinese actors are beginning to see the
former simply as part of the latter.
A second indicator of differentiation in respect of China’s
relationship to the Mekong region is the naming underlying
Chinese discourse on the river itself. Chinese sources intro-
duce the river as the “Lan Cang” river within China’s bor-
ders, and the Mekong once it leaves China. This does not
account for the multiple and varied namings of the river
along its full length, (69) nor indeed near its source in China,
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62. T G Moore, “Racing to Integrate, Or Cooperating to Compete,” in Wu and Lansdowne
(eds), op. cit., p. 43. 
63. For example the section entitled “Making It Happen” in ADB, The GMS, Beyond Borders,
op. cit., pp. 31 ff.
64. ADB, Vientiane Plan of Action, 2008, p. 61.
65. Yang, op. cit.
66. For example in Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State, New York, Free Press, 1995. 
67. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined ASEAN between 1995 and 1999. 
68. For example, He Shengda and Sheng Lijun’s essay on Yunnan’s GMS strategy in Saw
Swee Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah (eds), ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and
Prospects, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2005.
69. Sahai (op. cit., p. 17) translates the names in various downstream countries as “Nine
Dragons” (Vietnam), “Great Water” (Cambodia), “Mother of Waters” (Thailand and Laos).
Sahai, Osbourne, and Hori (op. cit.) also note the use of different names at the local level.
With the single name Mekong often used at the regional level, the identity of the river is
thus different when scaled at the local, national, or regional levels, with political bound-
aries affecting how the river is perceived.
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where “Za Qu” is used, (70) and indicates the dominance of
the Yunnan section in domestic discourse on the river. But
this naming also reflects a perception of the non-Chinese
part of the GMS region – or in other contexts, southeast
Asia – as a kind of isomorphic or unitary “other” to China. 
This bifurcation is also revealed in the language used to refer
to the geographical areas. Chinese sources, when not talking
about the “GMS” (for example da meigonghe ciquyu
hezuo), often use either yinzhi bandao or zhongnan bandao.
The first of these is a transliteration of the term “Indochina
peninsula,” which dates from the colonial period and was
also used by the Japanese during the Second World War,
but its usage does not make clear whether it refers to the
whole peninsula, including Thailand, or to the part of it that
was previously constituted as French Indo-China. The latter
term, which would most obviously translate literally as “south
(of) China peninsula,” is somewhat ambiguous, but clearly
Sino-centric, suggesting the peninsula as an extension from
(or to) China’s south. Others tend to use the term “south-
east Asia” (dongnanya), a mid-twentieth century term that
is geopolitically more neutral. (71) This is understood to cover
at least the area of the ten ASEAN countries, a much larg-
er land mass than the peninsula, leading to the use of “main-
land southeast Asia.”
Naming both the river and the land mass through which it
runs is therefore highly problematic, with the choice of
names reflecting the identity of the agent of regional con-
struction for projects of integration, resource management,
or economic cooperation. The names also reflect who is
marginalised by such projects, such as the local inhabitants
who have lost their indigenously-named river to a greater
regional identity. 
This ambiguity is reflected in the wider scholarship. The
ADB’s institutional structure, which led to the term “subre-
gion” being used, (72) is indicative of a typology not unique to
the ADB. Most of the scholarship, if it has a geographical
focus, tends to be from a dominant perspective of either
southeast Asia or China. Many of the studies on the
Mekong region have been produced by specialists on south-
east Asia, and perhaps as a result the coverage of China
within this literature is somewhat limited. The Chinese stud-
ies literature that has crept as far south as the areas of
Yunnan that could be construed as part of a Mekong region
has tended to focus either on specific cross-border issues
such as trade, or on internal Chinese political or economic
developments in that area. Attempts to bridge this divide
often structure the analysis by placing China and southeast
Asia (or a subset thereof) as two parties in the formulation
of the region. We saw above that in spite of some Chinese
government efforts to emphasise participation in the region,
other Chinese discourse served to reflect the ingrained
sense of China being contrasted to the areas over its border
into southeast Asia. This can either privilege China’s posi-
tion or undermine it by setting it up as the focus of “prob-
lems,” as in the Vietnamese discourse footnoted above,
which picks out China as the upstream villain. It also con-
structs a semblance of unity within the southeast Asian part
of “the region,” giving insufficient space to differences
between actors within that geographical area, (73) a separate
but related issue that warrants more comment in the context
of relations between China and its southeast Asian neigh-
bours. Co nclus ion
By tracing various Chinese constructions of the Mekong
region, this paper has explored one aspect of China’s
increasing engagement across its continental borders with
southeast Asia. Against a background of growth in regional
mechanisms for cooperation and integration, it shows the
dominance of economic motivations in China’s engagement
with the region, expressed through its privileging of the
GMS mechanism, but with subtly different central and
provincial approaches. This, in turn, shows the tension
between China’s participation in and differentiation from
this region stretching over China’s southwest continental bor-
ders. •
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70. Hori, op. cit., p. 3.
71. This term, too, has its political overtones. According to Bakker (art. cit., p. 219) the term
“entered into conventional usage only in the mid-20th century, following its adoption as
the title of the Allied military authority responsible for dispossessing Japan of territorial
gains made during the Pacific War.”
72. Footnote 14 above.
73. A recent (2008) example of differences within the region is the dispute between
Thailand and Cambodia over the Hindu temple Preah Vihear on the border between the
two countries (see e.g. “Disputed temple becomes political football threatening a gov-
ernment,” South China Morning Post, 10 July 2008 and subsequent reports).
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